


TOP SECRET

10 May 1965



25X1



Copy No. C 141


25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

JCS and State department
review(s) completed.



25X1

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

10 May 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Dominican Republic: Rebel activity in Santo Domingo increased last night. (Page 1)

25X1

3. South Vietnam: Viet Cong regulars now listed at 64,600. (Page 6)

25X1

6. Cyprus: Significant progress for Cyprus solution unlikely at London talks. (Page 10)

7. Rhodesia: Overwhelming election victory gives Smith good bargaining hand. (Page 11)

8. Notes: Kashmir;

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 May 1965

*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Rebel activity in Santo Domingo increased last night with somewhat heavier sniper fire against US forces and an abortive attack on a loyalist outpost in the northwestern area of the city.

The interior remains relatively calm with a lessening of tension evident and some Dominicans optimistic that a return to normality is near.

The Government of National Reconstruction is getting off to a methodical start under the leadership of Antonio Imbert. Today may be an important day for the new government since it has appealed to all workers to return to their jobs. Imbert's officials have devised a means of paying back wages to government day laborers throughout the country. This move will be an important psychological weapon for the loyalist and could take much steam out of a reported rebel plan to launch a series of strikes beginning on 10 May.

Imbert has named several key officials, including former naval chief of staff Rivera Caminero as secretary of state for the armed forces and pro-US diplomat Horacio Vicioso as foreign minister. Yesterday Imbert announced that eight top-ranking military officers had been separated from their commands "for the good of the country." Most of these officers have long been associated with graft and corruption and their removal should do much to rebuild morale within the loyalist camp as well as improve Imbert's public image.

There are a few small signs of diminishing rebel confidence in themselves and possible splits within the

rebel movement. Caamano's troops in downtown Santo Domingo reportedly are complaining about food shortages and Communist leaders within the rebel ranks are said to be worried that Imbert's plan to pay wage arrears will be successful.

Meanwhile, there is still no indication that any government has recognized the Caamano regime or is about to do so. On 8 May the rebels reiterated an earlier plea to thirty-six governments for "immediate recognition." Cuba and all other Communist governments were omitted from these solicitations.

25X1

10 May 65

2

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

25X1

*South Vietnam: A recent joint US/South Vietnamese reappraisal places confirmed Viet Cong regular combat troops at 47,000, compared to the previous figure of 39,000. An additional 17,600 Viet Cong noncombat support personnel have also been confirmed, for a total of 64,600 regular Viet Cong troops.

These new figures essentially do not represent an over-all increase in Viet Cong strength in recent weeks, but apparently result from the acceptance by MACV of Viet Cong units previously listed in a probable category plus others already held by South Vietnamese Army intelligence. Apart from these regular forces are the approximately 80-100,000 Viet Cong irregulars who operate as self-defense and militia troops.

The new figure for confirmed Viet Cong combat regulars raises the total number of regimental headquarters from five to nine, and the total number of main force and provincial battalions to 61--up from 54. The regular North Vietnamese battalion recently identified in Kontum Province is included in this count.

Despite the heavy casualties sustained by the Viet Cong, MACV's strength holdings for Viet Cong regulars has steadily risen since the US command was established in 1962. This increase is attributable in part to infiltration and local recruitment, but it also reflects greater availability of intelligence and more refined techniques for the analysis and identification of the already existent Viet Cong regular force structure.

25X1

10 May 65

6

25X1

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Cyprus: There appears little likelihood that significant progress toward a Cyprus solution will emerge from Greek-Turkish talks during the 11-13 May NATO meeting in London.

On 7 May in Athens King Constantine chaired an extraordinary meeting of Greek Government and opposition leaders and Archbishop Makarios, which apparently accomplished little. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Apparently there was general agreement that the Greek Cypriots would take no new initiatives likely to endanger the present precarious peace.

25X1

25X1

The Greeks probably will try to limit discussions at London to questions involving security on the island and means for continuing the conversations, but will make only tentative initial probes regarding terms for a settlement. Prime Minister Papandreou has expressed deep skepticism that the Turks will be able to negotiate meaningfully with Greece until after Turkish parliamentary elections, scheduled for October.

Such a limited agenda may not satisfy the Turks, who have repeatedly emphasized their determination to secure some progress toward a solution at London. It appears likely the Turks will express at the NATO meeting their concern over the number of Greek troops on Cyprus and may try to secure an inspection of these troops by NATO military authorities. Athens can be expected to oppose vigorously such a proposal. [REDACTED]

25X1

10 May 65

10

Rhodesia: [Prime Minister Smith's overwhelming victory in Rhodesia's parliamentary election strengthens his position for negotiations with London for full independence and also for initiating constitutional amendments designed to consolidate white minority control.]

[Smith's Rhodesia Front party swept all of the 50 seats elected by the predominantly white "A" roll. The party entered no candidates for the 15 seats representing the mostly African "B" roll.]

[Having gained the two-thirds parliamentary majority required to initiate amendments to the 1961 constitution, Smith probably will push through the revisions he discussed vaguely during the campaign. Several are designed to give a semblance of progress for the Africans. The franchise may be extended to all taxpayers. However, the Africans, who outnumber the whites in Rhodesia almost 20 to 1, would be registered on the "B" roll and would still elect only a small minority of the legislators.]

[Britain's policy is to withhold Rhodesian independence unless eventual majority rule is somehow assured, and Britain is subject to strong Afro-Asian pressures to establish majority rule soon. Nevertheless it would be very difficult politically for London to annul constitutional amendments duly passed by the Rhodesian Parliament--much more difficult than imposing sanctions to punish an outright declaration of independence. Smith apparently hopes that he can exploit this dilemma to negotiate independence on the basis of the projected constitutional revisions.]

25X1

NOTES

25X1

Kashmir: Serious rioting in Srinagar, resulting from the internment of Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah by the Indian Government, could give rise to communal disturbances in other parts of the subcontinent. Abdullah's appeals for the Vale of Kashmir's separation from India and his recent talks with Chou En-lai in Algiers have angered many Indians, and also embarrassed Prime Minister Shastri. Indian leaders have already feared communal outbreaks as a result of events in the Rann of Kutch, where there is presently a fragile standoff.

25X1

10 May 65

12

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300080001-1

~~TOP SECRET~~